Abstract. We use graph convergence of set valued maps to show the existence of an equilibrium for an abstract economy without assuming the lower semi continuity of the constraint maps.
Introduction
In 1975 Shafer and Sonnenschein 1975] proved the existence of equilibria for abstract economies without ordered preferences. Over the last twenty y ears, more general existence results appeared in the literature. To make a partial list of these results we mention Borglin and Keiding 1976] , Yannelis and Prabhakar 1983] , Toussaint 1983 ], Yannelis 1987] , Tarafdar 1989] , and Tan and Yuan 1994] . All of these results however, assume directly or indirectly the lower semi-continuity of the set valued map representing the constraints for each agent. In this paper, we will use the concept of graphical convergence of set-valued maps to show that an equilibrium for an abstract economy exists without such an assumption. Eliminating the requirement o f t h e l o wer semi-continuity of the constraint map is not just technical improvement. It will actually make the setting of the abstract economy more realistic as we will demonstrate at the end of the paper. We s t a r t b y reviewing the mathematical and the economical concepts that we need. Then, we p r o ve s e v eral results regarding the existence of equilibria for abstract economies without assuming the lower semi-continuity o f t h e of the constraint map. Finally, w e discuss some of the economical implications of the new results.
Preliminaries
In this section, we review some basic de nitions and theorems regarding set convergence and set valued maps. Set convergence Let X bea topological vector space. Let 2 X bethe collection of all subsets of X. For a subset K in 2 X we use the following notation: cl K denotes the closure of K in X. int K denotes the interior of K in X. con K denotes the convex hull of K.
Let C(X) be the collection of closed nonempty subsets of X. We are interested in set convergence in C(X). Recall that a set D is directed by a relation , i f is re exive and transitive and for all 1 and 2 in D, 9 3 2 D such that 3 1 and 3 2 . We de ne the collection of co nal subsets, N 1 (D), and the collection of residual subsets , N # (D), of a directed set D: N 1 (D) = fN DjN contains all the elements of D at or beyond some index 2 Dg N # (D) = fN DjN contains some elements of D at or beyond each index 2 Dg: Let fC j 2 Dg bea net in C(X). We d e n e the Inner limit, Li, and the Upper limit, Ls:
Li C = fx 2 Xj9N 0 2 N 1 (D) such that x 0 2 C 0 8 0 2 N and x 0 ;! xg 2 Ls C = fx 2 Xj9N 0 2 N # (D) such that x 0 2 C 0 8 0 2 N 0 and x 0 ;! xg where in bothde nitions x 0 ;! x indicates the convergence of fx 0 g to x in X. We say that C converges to C in C(X), and we write C ;! C, when Li C = L s C = C. This notion of set convergence is referred to in the literature as the Painlev e-Kuratowski set convergence. In general the Painlev e-Kuratowski set convergence is topological if and only if X is locally compact (cf. Klein and Thompson 1984] ).
The following is a well known lemma Lemma 1.1. Let fC j 2 Dg be a net in C(X) that is decreasing with respect to inclusion, For more on set convergence, see Beer 1993] Finally we state a key lemma that we will use in proving our main results. Lemma 1.2. Let fF j 2 Dg be a net of set valued maps form a topological space X to subsets of a topological space Y . Suppose Ls gph F gph F and suppose F is closed. Let fx 0 g and fy 0 g besuch that y 0 2 F 0 (x 0 ) 8 0 2 N 0 2 N # (D): Furthermore, suppose that x 0 ;! x and y 0 ;! y. Then, y 2 F(x). Proof. Clearly, (x y ) 2 gph F and (x y) 2 Ls gph F by the de nition of the Upper limit of F . Hence, (x y) 2 gph F.
Selection theorems and abstract economies Most equilibria results in abstract economies are based on selection theorems that lead to x point theorems. We recall that for a set valued map F, a selection is a continuous 4 function f such that 8x 2 X f(x) 2 F(x). We say F has a xed point, if 9x 2 X such that x 2 F(x ). We use ; = (X i A i P i I ) to denote an abstract economy. I is the set of agents. X i is the strategy set for the ith agent. Let X = Q i2I X i , and for any x 2 X, let x i bethe ith component o f x. P i : X ! ! X i is a map that represents the preferences of the ith agent. A i : X ! ! X i is a map that represents the constraints for the ith agent. An equilibrium for this economy is a point x 2 X such that for all i 2 I, A i \ P i (x ) = and x i 2 cl A i (x ):
The main result The idea that we use for all the proofs in this section is the same and it is fairly simple. Instead of assuming the lower semi-continuity of the constraint maps, we \fatten" the graphs of theses maps. The \fattened" maps have open graphs, hence they are ols. and lsc. We apply the existing equilibrium results to the \fattened" maps and then we use Lemmas 1.1 and 1.2 to show that the equilibrium points of the \fattened" maps yield an equilibrium point for the original problem. Let X and Y betopological spaces. We index the local base of the zero element of the space X Y with an ordered set D. Thus for any two elements V 1 and V 2 of the local base at the zero element of X Y , w e have Proof. In light of Lemma 1.1, we only need to show that \ 2D gph S cl gph S. Let x 6 2 cl gph S. Since cl(gph S) is compact, 9 0 2 D such that x 6 2 gph S 0 and therefore x 6 2 \ 2D gph S .
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We n o w prove a result that is based on a theorem of Tan and Yuan 1994] Furthermore, it is clear that the converse of Lemma 1.7. is true. Hence, from now on we will not distinguish between locally L-majorized maps and L-majorized maps.
We now state a simpli ed version of a result of Tan and Yuan 1994] . The following theorem is our main result: Theorem 1.7. Let ; = ( X i A i P i I ) bean abstract economy satisfying for all i 2 I : (a) X i is a nonempty, compact and convex subset of a Hausdor locally convex space E i . (b) A i is nonempty, convex valued map such that cl A i is usc.
Then, ; has an equilibrium. where the upper limit is taking over all i 2 i (N ) and the rst set inclusion holds because of Lemma 1.3. and the last equality holds because of Fact 3.
Finally, from (1) and (2) we conclude that for all i 2 I,x 6 2 U i andx i 2 cl A i ( x) and thus, x is an equilibrium point for ;.
Note that in the proof of theorem 3.2 in Tan and Yan 1994] , the idea was to \fatten" the values of the constraint maps, whereas the idea of our proof of theorem 1.7. is to \fatten" the graphs of the set valued maps.
The nite dimensional case Suppose I is a countable set and for all i 2 I, let E i beIR n . We then can have a di erent set of conditions that guarantee the existence of an equilibrium. Furthermore, since IR n is rst countable, we will consider sequences instead of nets and for all i 2 I, we will take D i to bethe set of natural numbers . Let X beIR n and for any C 2 C(X) and for any x 2 X, let d The following lemmas are Lemma 1.1. and Lemma 1.3. in a metric setting. 8 Lemma 1.8. Let C n be a sequence in C(X) that is decreasing with respect to inclusion, then Ls C n \ n 1 C n : lemma 1.9. Let C be a compact set in C(X). Let " n be a sequence of reals that monotonically decrease to 0. Then, Ls S " n C] C: Theorem 1.10. Let ; = (X i A i P i I ) be an abstract economy. Assume that for every i 2 I, where I is a countable set of agents, ; satis es : (a) X i becompact and convex subset of IR n . (b) A i : X ! ! X i is such that cl A i is nonempty, convex valued, and usc. (c) P i : X ! ! X i is lsc.
(e) 8x 2 X, x 6 2 con P i (x).
Then, the abstract economy ; has an equilibrium. Proof. The proof follows the outlines of the proofs of Theorem 1.7. and theorem 6.1. We know now that 8i 2 I and 8n 2 IN, A n i is open and A n i is usc. We also know from Lemma 1.9. that 8i 2 I, Ls gph A n i gph A i :
Now let ' n i (x) = A n i \P i (x), 8x 2 X. Since A n i is open, ' n i is lsc. by F act 6. Furthermore, the set U n i = fx 2 Xj dom ' n i 6 = g is open in X and 8n 2 IN, U i U n i 8i 2 I :
X is a mertizable space and U n i is paracompct. By theorem 3.2" in Michael 1955] , the restriction of ' n i to U n i has a selection f n i . Let
A n i (x) otherwise . Then, F n i is usc.(lemma 6.1 in Yannelis and Prabhakar 1983] ) with closed, convex, and nonempty values. Finally, 8n 2 IN, the map F n : X ! ! X, where F n = Q i2I F n i , is also 9 usc. by lemma 3 in Fan (1952, p. 124) ]. Hence, 9x n such that x n 2 F n (x n ). Therefore, 8i 2 I, we have x n 6 2 U n i (otherwise x n i 2 con P i ) and x n i 2 A n i (x n i ). Since X is compact, 9x 2 X such that x n ;! x . >From (4) and from the fact that U i is open, we have x 6 2 U i and A i \ P i (x ) = 8i 2 I : (5) >From ( >From (5) and (6) we conclude that the economy has an equilibrium.
Note that above theorem is not a sepcial case of Theorem 1.7 since condition (c) of Theorem 1.7 does not imply condition (c) of Theorem 1.10. In a subsequent paper, we h o p e t o s h o w that the method of \fattening" the constraint maps can be used in abstract economies where the set of agents is a measure space and thus we hope to beable to weaken some of the conditions of the existence results of Yannelis 1987] .
Budget constraints and Walrasian equilibrium
In this section, we show that eliminating the requirement of the lower semi-continuity of the constraint map is signi cant economically. One of the important ways to show the existence of a Walrasian equilibrium is to use the abstract economy approach where the agents are divided into consumers, producers, and an auctioneer.(see Debreu 1959] and Gale and Mas-Colell 1975] ). Let us consider the case where the commodity space is IR m and the set of agents is nite, I = 1 : : : n . Let X i denote the ith consumer's consumption set, w i denote his initial endowment, and U i denote his preference relation on X i . For j = i ::: k, Y j denotes the jth producer's production set. i j (p) i s a function that denotes the share of the ith consumer in the pro ts of jth supplier at the given price level p. The auctioneer is a player with a strategy set that consist of a simplex IR m that represents the set of normalized prices. Our main concern in this model is the constraint map (the budget map) A i for the ith consumer. We let X = Q n i=1 X i , Y = Q k j=1 Y j and for every p 2 a n d e v ery j, w e l e t j (p) = s u p y j 2Y j p:y j . Now the budget map for the ith consumer In order to use the equilibrium results that currently exist in the literature, the budget map has to be lsc. However, to guarantee the lower semi continuity of such a map, one has to assume the continuity of each i j (:). More importantly, one has to assume that 8i and for all p 2 , 9x i 2 X i such that p:x i < p :
The most common way to satisfy the above condition is to assume that i j (p) are non negative and 8i and 8p p:w i > inf
The strict inequalities in (y) and (z) mean that consumers can not function when their consumption is compatible with their minimal income. The same problem occurs even when we use two sets of constraint maps and we assume that one of them is lsc. 
